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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
ROY FREE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
SWEN C. JENSEN, CHRIS JENSEN 
and ALMA JENSEN, his wife, RE-
GIONAL AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 
CORPORATION OF SALT LAKE 
CITY, UTAH, a corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Appellants' Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
6326 
The decree appealed from was entered in an action 
brought by the respondent to quiet title to a parcel of farm-
ing land located near Woods Cross in Davis County. The 
complaint is in the usual form except that it alleged that 
the defendants Chris Jensen and Alma Jensen were in 
possession of the premises. Since the validity of a tax 
title is one of the questions involved it becomes important 
to keep in mind the exact description of the property set 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
forth in the original complaint. That description is as 
follows: (Tr. 1-3). 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Section 
34, Townsip 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian; running thence South 22 5/7 rods; thence 
West to Jordan River ; thence North along the East 
bank to the North line of Section 33, East to begin-
ning, containing 80 acres. 
Also beginning 22 5/7 rods South from the 
Northeast corner of Section 33 aforesaid; running 
thence South 52lj3 rods; thence West to the Jordan 
River; thence North along the East bank of the 
river to a point 22 5/7 rods South from the North 
line of Section 33 ; thence East to beginning, con-
taining 183 acres. 
After the trial had begun the plaintiff, over the ob-
jection of the appellants, was permitted to amend the 
' complaint by striking out the words "Section 33" in the 
second line of the second paragraph of the description 
and inserting in lieu thereof the words "Section 34." 
(Tr. 11). The defendants Jensen answered the complaint, 
denying plaintiff's title, claiming equitable ownership in 
themselves, and asserting that plaintiff's claim of title 
was founded upon a deed from Davis County which con-
veyed no title because of irregularities in the tax sale 
proceedings leading up to and including the auditor's deed. 
They also alleged that the plaintiff purchased the property 
from the county pursuant to a collusive arrangement be· 
tween the plaintiff and the defendants Alice Farnworth 
and D. A. Skeen, which in effect created in the plaintiff 
a nominal title only, the real beneficiaries of the purchase 
being the defendants Farnworth and Skeen. (Tr. 28). The 
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defendant Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation of 
Salt Lake City also answered the complaint, and after 
putting in issue plaintiff's claim of title set up the lien 
of the judgment recovered by it against the defendant 
Alice Farnworth and her husband James Farnworth. This 
defendant further alleged that the defendant Alice Farn~ 
worth was the equitable owner of the property, subject 
to the lien of the judgment, and that whatever title the 
plaintiff acquired from Davis County was held in trust by 
him for the defendant Alice F'arnworth. (Tr. 25.) 
The defendants Alice Farnworth and D. A. Skeen con-
veniently defaulted although the latter did set up a mort~ 
gage in his favor given to him by his co-defendant. 
Upon the issues raised by the above mentioned plead-
ings the court awarded the property described in the 
amended complaint to the plaintiff and quieted his title 
against all adverse claims of the defendants. (Tr. 23.) 
Upon the trial it was stipulated that the appellant Regional 
Agricultural Credit Corporation of Salt Lake City, Utah 
was awarded a judgment against the defendant Alice Farn-
worth and James Farnworth, her husband, in the amount 
alleged in that defendant's answer; that the judgment was 
docketed and filed in the office of the clerk of Davis 
County on March 15, 1935 and that it remained wholly un-
satisfied. (Tr. 22.) It was further stipulated that the lien 
of this judgment was prior and superior to the mortgage 
of the defendant Skeen. (Tr. 41.) Although this mortgage 
was prior in time to the judgment, the defendant Skeen by 
agreement expressly made his mortgage subsequent and 
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inferior to the judgment in favor of the R. A. C. C. (Defs. 
Ex. 4.) 
As the basis of his claim of ownership to the property 
described in the amended complaint the plaintiff intro-
duced in evidence the auditor's deed to Davis County. This 
deed covers the following described property. 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Section 34, 
Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Mer-
idian; running thence South 22 5/7 rods; thence 
West to Jordan River; thence North along the East 
bank to the North line of Section 33, East to be-
ginning, containing 80 acres. 
Also beginning 22 5/7 rods South from the 
Northeast corner of above Section ; running thence 
South 521j3 rods; thence West to the Jordan River; 
thence North along the East bank of the river to a 
point 22 5/7 rods South from the North line of Sec-
tion 33; thence East to beginning, containing 183 
acres. 
Plaintiff then introduced in evidence a certificate of 
sale issued by the treasurer of Davis County. This certifi-
cate covers the following described property. (Plfs. Ex. B.) 
Beg NE cor of Sec 34, Twp 2 N, Rg 1 W, SLM; 
S 22 5/7 rds; W to Jordan River; N along E bank 
to N line of Sec 33, E to beg. cont 80 a. Also beg 
22 5/7 rds S fr NE cor of above Sec ; S 521!3 rds; 
W to Jordan River; N along E bank of river to a pt 
22 5/7 rds S fr N line of Sec 33 ; E to beg. cont 183 A. 
The notice of May sale recites that the County Commis-
sioners will sell for cash on the 15th day of May, 1939, etc., 
pursuant to Section 80-10-68 of the Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933, the following described property, assessed in 
the following names, to wit: (Plfs. Ex. A.) 
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"JAMES FARNSWORTH-Beginning at the North-
east corner of Section 34, Township 2 North, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian ; running 
thence South 22 5/7 rods; thence West to Jor-
dan River ; thence North along the East bank 
to the North line of Section 33 ; thence East to 
beginning, containing 80 acres. 
"Also beginning 22 5/7 rods South from the North-
east corner of the above Section, running thence 
South 52lf3 rods; thence West to Jordan River; 
thence North along the East bank of the river 
to a point 22 5/7 rods South from the North 
line of Section 33 ; thence East to beginning, 
containing 183 acres." 
The deed under which plaintiff claims to have acquired 
title from Davis County is executed and acknowledged by 
the County Auditor. (Plfs. Ex. C.) It contains no pre-
liminary recitals, although in the body of the deed it is 
stated that the conveyance is made in consideration of the 
payment by the grantee of the sum of $643.40, delinquent 
taxes, penalties, interest and costs, constituting a charge 
against the property, which was sold to the County for non~ 
payment of taxes for the year 1933 in the sum of $127.49. 
It is also stated that the property was duly advertised and 
sold to the highest bidder at a public auction on the 15th 
day of May, 1939. The property is described substantially 
as it is described in the amended complaint. On the 7th day 
of December, 1933, James Farnworth conveyed to his wife, 
the defendant Alice Farnworth, the following described 
property: 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Section 
Thirty-four (34), Township Two (2) North, Range 
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One ( 1) West, Salt Lake Meridian, running thence 
South 22 5 /7th rods ; thence West to the Jordan 
River; thence Northerly along the East Bank of the 
Jordan River to the North line of Section Thirty. 
three (33) Township and Range aforesaid; thence 
East to the point of beginning. Containing 80 acres, 
more or less. 
Also beginning 22 5/7th rods South of the 
Northeast corner of Section Thirty-three (33), 
Township and Range aforesaid, thence South 52¥3 
rods; thence West to the Jordan River; thence North-
erly along the East Bank of the Jordan River, to a 
point 22 5/7th rods South from the North line of 
Section Thirty-three (33) aforesaid, thence East 
to the point of beginning. Containing 183 acres, 
more or less. 
This deed was recorded April 2, 1934. Thereafter the 
property described in the amended complaint was assessed 
to the defendant Alice Farnworth notwithstanding the fact 
that she held the title to the first parcel only consisting of 
eighty acres. (Tr. 17.) 
The facts which appellants claim demonstrate that the 
plaintiff purchased the property pursuant to a collusive 
plan to deprive the appellants of their interest in the 
property may be thus summarized. Under date of November 
4, 1935 the defendant Alice Farnworth and her deceased 
husband entered into an exchange agreement with the ap-
pellants Chris Jensen and Alma Jensen whereby the Farn-
worths undertook to exchange the property in question for 
property in Salt Lake. (See defendants' Exhibit 3). The 
Farnworths agreed to pay the taxes for the years 1933 and 
1934 which were then in default. As previously stated, the 
appellant R. A. C. C. had recovered a judgment against 
Th:~ a o 
t 
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the defendant Alice Farnworth in the sum in excess of 
$1500.00 which was a lien upon the property when the 
exchange agreement was entered into. In this situation 
Mrs. Farnworth appealed to the plaintiff, who was a friend 
of the family, for assistance to prevent the loss of her 
interests in the property. (Tr. 29.) At first the plaintiff 
refused any aid but upon being repeatedly importuned fin-
ally consented to help her. She prevailed upon him to go to 
the office of her attorney, D. A. Skeen, who was also a 
friend of the plaintiff, and as above stated, held a mort-
gage on the property. (Tr. 29.) It was there decided that 
plaintiff should bid in this property at the tax sale. Skeen 
assured plaintiff that he, Skeen, would take the property 
off the plaintiff's hands. (Tr. 32.) Plaintiff repeatedly 
stated that he purchased the property to protect the in-
terests of Mrs. Farnworth and Skeen and that Skeen as-
sured him that when he, Skeen, took over the property Mrs. 
Farnworth's interests would be protected. (Tr. 36.) It 
was decided that immediately after bidding in the property 
an action would be brought in the plaintiff's name to quiet 
the title. Skeen accompanied the plaintiff to Farmington 
to bid in the property. (Tr. 28.) He examined the proceed-
ings leading up to the sale and told the plaintiff that they 
were regular. (Tr. 28.) Immediately after bidding in the 
property the plaintiff ahd Skeen entered into a written 
agreement in which the plaintiff agreed to transfer the 
property to Skeen for the amount which plaintiff bid for 
it plus interest and his expenses (See Plaintiff's Exhibit D). 
This agreement recites that Skeen was not in a position to 
bid in the property hi'mself and that it might be necessary 
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to quiet the title which Skeen undertook to do without charge. 
The complaint in the present action was prepared by Skeen. 
(Tr. 27.) Plaintiff knew of the judgment in favor of the 
R. A. C. C. (Tr. 37) and also knew of the exchange agre~ 
ment with Jensens and that they were living on the property 
(Tr. 39.) Plaintiff admitted that he did not want the 
property (Tr. 39) and that he never examined the property 
although he did visit it at one time. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
The appellants assert that the findings of fact which 
are numbered 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 19 are not sup-
ported by any evidence and are contrary to the undisputed 
evidence, and that the conclusions and judgment of the 
court are contrary to the evidence and the law. More par-
ticularly stated, the errors relied upon are that the evidence 
discloses that the plaintiff acquired no title from Davis 
County because the deed under which he claims was not 
executed by any lawfully authorized officer; that the cer-
tificate of sale and assessment of the property are void 
because the property is not described with sufficient cer-
tainty and definiteness; that the plaintiff offered no evi-
dence to prove that the tax sale under which he claims was 
lawfully conducted or properly made; that the property was 
sold at the tax sale for a sum largely in excess of the amount 
of any taxes lawfully assessed, thereby rendering the sale 
void. Appellants further assert that the, court erred in 
rendering a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the 
reason that the evidence disclosed that the plaintiff pur-
chased the property at the tax sale pursuant to a collusive 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
and fraudulent arrangement entered into with the defendant 
Alice Farnworth and defendant D. A. Skeen for the pur-
pose of depriving appellants of their rights in the property. 
Appellants also urge that the court erred in allowing the 
plaintiff to amend his complaint to describe an entirely 
different piece of property from that mentioned in the 
original complaint. 
I. THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY IN A 
CERTIFICATE OF SALE MUST BE DEFINITE AND 
CERTAIN AND RESORT TO EXTRANEOUS FACTS IS 
NOT PERMISSIBLE TO RESOLVE AMBIGUITIES. 
Buckner v. Sugg, 96 S. W. 184. 
Cooper v. Lee, 27 S. W. 970. 
Burton v. Hoover, 74 P. (2) 652, 93 Utah 498. 
Allen v. Fitzgerald, 23 Utah 597, 65 P. 592. 
Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, 93 Utah 
561, 74 P. (2) 1184. 
The description of the property as it appears in the 
certificate of sale has already been set forth. It is composed 
almost entirely of symbols, figures, abbreviations and con-
,. tractions. The statute in force at the time the certificate 
was made provided that in the assessment of land or the 
advertisement and sale thereof for taxes initial letters, 
~; abbreviations, and figures may be used to designate the 
;; township, range, section or parts of sections (80-11-6, Re-
:: vised Statutes of Utah, 1933). It will be observed that the 
ii statute does not authorize the use of initial letters, abbrevia-
tions or figures in the certificate of sale but for the pur-
r: poses of this argument we shall assume it is broad enough 
:1 to warrant the use of symbols and abbreviations in a certif-
:i icate of sale. We do, however, emphasize that the use of 
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initial letters and abbreviations is authorized for no other 
purpose than to designate township, range, section or parts 
of section. It follows that symbols, abbreviations and figures 
to designate starting points, courses, distances or natural 
boundaries is without statutory justification. In Tintic 
Undine Mining Company v. Ercanbrack, supra, this court 
said that a description of the property in the certificate of 
sale "must be definite enough so the owner will know just 
what property is being sold and a prospective purchaser 
will know what particular property he could buy so as to 
determine its value." The test thus announced was undoubt-
edly sufficient to dispose of that case. The court did not 
attempt to confine the test to any definite limitations. It 
is therefore entirely permissible to adopt a more compre-
hensive test without in any way impairing the decision in 
the Ercanbrack case. In the case of Buckner v. Sugg, 96 
S. W. 184, it is said : 
"The description in tax proceedings must be such 
as will fully apprise the owner without recourse to 
the superior knowledge peculiar to him as owner that 
the particular tract of his land is sought to be charged 
with a tax lien. It must be such as will notify the 
public what lands are to be offered for sale in case 
the tax be not paid," 
and in Cooper v. Lee, supra, it is said that a descrip-
tion which is intelligible only to persons possessing more 
than the average intelligence, or the use and understanding 
of which is confined to the locality in which the land lies 
is not sufficient. It must be remembered in testing the suffi-
ciency of a property description in a tax certificate we are 
not searching for the intent of the parties to the instru-
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ment. The maker of the document does not intend to convey 
anything. Neither does the owner of the property by such 
an instrument convey or intend to convey anything. All 
that can be said is that the certificate affects no property 
except that which comes within the legal meaning of the 
language used. 
In Devlin on Deeds, Section 1408, the author states the 
rule governing the interpretation of tax deeds as follows : 
"The rule governing descriptions in tax deeds is 
thus stated by Mr. Justice Ruggles: 'In a deed be-
tween individuals, a part of the premises conveyed 
may be rejected on account of its falsity, if after 
its rejection there is enough left to show clearly 
what the owner intended to convey. In this case, if 
the owner of the land had executed the deed, giving 
the boundaries correctly, the title might have passed, 
although the land was falsely described as to the 
village in which it lay. It would then present the 
question what the owner intended to convey. There 
is no such question here. The owner conveys nothing, 
and does not intend to convey anything. If the offi-
cers who undertake to convey for him intend to con-
vey lands lying on one place by a deed describing 
them as lying in a different place, they intend to do 
what the statute, under which they profess to act, 
-does not permit. . . ' " 
It will be observed that the property is described in 
the certificate of sale by means of abbreviation of starting 
points, initial letters to indicate the meridian, figures and 
initials to indicate courses and distances, ends of courses 
and quantities. Many words necessary to make a definite 
and intelligable description are omitted. The manner in 
which the figures are arranged in the description makes it 
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impossible to determine what the total figure might be, 
thus rendering the distances and boundaries uncertain. 
Not even an experienced conveyancer or one possessing 
superior knowledge of conveying could say with any degree 
of certainty what property is affected by the certificate. 
It would require parol evidence and a decree of court to 
resolve the uncertainties and ambiguities and fix the loca-
tion and boundaries of the property. The description wholly 
fails to meet the tests laid down under the authorities cited 
and therefore makes the certificate void. 
There is even a more fatal error in the description 
than that which is created by the abbreviations, initial let-
ters, symbols, figures and omissions above referred to. It 
is impossible to determine the starting point of the second 
parcel. It purports to be some distance from the "above 
Sec." Assuming the word "Sec." stands for section it is 
impossible to know what section is meant. Two sections are 
referred to above the words "above Sec." One is Section 
34 and the other is Section 33. The one next above is Sec-
tion 33. If the words "above Sec." refer to Section 33 then 
it relates to property that is not involved in this litigation 
and is not embraced within the tax deed under which the 
plaintiff claims. The logical section referred to by the 
words "above Sec." would be the section next above re-
ferred to, which is Section 33. To say the least, we have 
thus created an ambiguity in the description which cannot 
be removed since we cannot resort to extrinsic evidence. 
Whether this description would be valid if contained in a 
deed between individuals is a matter of no concern because 
we are not dealing with any question of intention of the 
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party executing the certificate. It most assuredly is not 
definite enough or certain enough to enable a person with 
average intelligence to know just what property was being 
sold. Without the aid of parol evidence it would not be 
possible for even a person possessing superior knowledge 
of conveyancing to determine what property is affected. 
We submit that under the decisions above cited the de-
scription of the property in the certificate of sale must be 
held to be so uncertain and ambiguous as to render the 
certificate of no force or effect. 
II. THE BURDEN RESTS UPON THE PLAINTIFF 
TO PROVE THAT THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS 
OF A VALID MAY SALE WERE STRICTLY COMPLIED 
WITH. 
Utah Lead Company v. Piute County, 92 Utah 1, 
65 Pac. (2) 1190. 
Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, 93 
Utah 561, 74 P. (2) 1184. 
222. 
Jungk v. Snyder, 28 Utah 1, 78 P. 168. 
Moon v. Salt Lake County, 27 Utah 435, 76 P. 
Asper v. Moon, 24 Utah, 241, 67 P. 409. 
Bean v. Fairbanks, 46 Utah 513, 151 P. 338. 
Hatch v. Edwards, 72 Utah 113, 269 P. 138. 
Olson v. Bagley, 10 Utah 492, 37 P. 739. 
Eastman v. Gurrey, 15 Utah 410, 49 P. 310. 
Wall v. Kaighn, 144 P. 1100, 45 Utah 244. 
Buck v. Canty, 121 P. 924. 
Brokaw v. Cottrell, 211 N. W. 184. 
Golden, etc. v. Miller, 220 N. W. 839. 
Davis v. Minnesota Baptist Convention, 16' P. 
(2) 48. 
Hodgkin v. Boswell, 127 P. 985. 
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Gage v. Pumpelly, 115 U. S. 454, 6 S. Ct. 136, 
29 L. Ed. 449. 
At the time this sale was held the controlling statu~ 
tory provisions are to be found in Section 80-10-68, Session 
Laws of Utah, 1933. This section provides that whenever 
a county has received a tax deed for any property sold for 
delinquent taxes the Board of County Commissioners must 
during the month of May in each year, after publication, 
offer for sale at the front door of the county courthouse 
at the time specified in the notice to the highest bidder each 
parcel of real estate which has been conveyed to the county 
during the calendar year pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 80-10-66. The first bid received in an amount 
sufficient to pay the taxes, penalties, interest and costs, 
including all taxes assessed subsequently to the date of the 
certificate of sale shall be accepted unless a further bid in 
an amount sufficient to pay said taxes, penalties, interest 
and costs for less than the entire parcel, shall be received, 
and the highest bid shall be construed to mean the bid of 
that bidder who will pay in cash the full amount of the 
taxes, penalties, interest and costs for the smallest portion 
of the entire parcel. The Board of County Commissioners 
shall at any time after the period of redemption has expired 
and before the sale, as herein provided, permit the redemp· 
tion of such property. 
It is as clear as can be made by the written word 
that the owner of property retains at least a qualified 
interest in it until it has been divested by the proceedings 
outlined in Section 80-10-68. Whether that interest be 
described as a right of redemption or some other legal or 
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equitable estate is a matter of no importance. Unquestion .. 
ably it is a valuable property right. The owner cannot be 
be divested of it except in the manner prescribed by the 
statute. Unless and until there has been "the sale as herein 
provided," the owner retains his qualified estate in the 
property. This is so because the County Commissioners 
must permit the owner to redeem his property. Since the 
statute says that the right of redemption persists until sale 
is had "as herein provided," a sale which is not in accord .. 
ance with the directions specified in the statute would 
leave the right of redemption unimpaired. It inevitably 
follows also that the purchaser at an irregular sale would 
acquire no title. As authority for these almost self-evident 
propositions we have the decision of this court in the recent 
case of Utah Lead Company v. Piute County, supra, wherein 
the County Commissioners undertook to sell property with~ 
out having first offered it at the May sale. It is there said: 
"The· County Commissioners have no authority 
to sell tax title land privately until the public sale was 
had. The sale to Young therefore of parcel number 
1 was void." 
Since a valid May sale is jurisdictional to divest the 
owner of his qualified estate and also to vest in the pur-
chaser at such a sale any title, it was incumbent upon the 
plaintiff in this action to prove that the sale was 'con-
ducted in strict accordance with the requirements of the 
statute. It must be kept in mind that at the time the 
plaintiff acquired his deed there was no statute making 
his deed prima facie evidence of either the facts recited in 
it or the regularity of any proceedings leading up to it. 
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In the absence of such a statute nothing is presumed in 
aid of the plaintiff's title. Without affirmative proof of 
strict compliance with the statute plaintiff fails to show 
any title. As pointed out by this court repeatedly, the last 
time in Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, supra: 
"It is elemental, and settled beyond argument 
in this jurisdiction, that tax sale proceedings and 
statutes are strictissimi juris. The sales are made 
exclusively under statutory authority. The seller is 
making a sale not coupled with an interest, and de-
rives his authority solely from the statute, and it is 
derived from no rule or principle of the common law. 
He can have no authority to sell except as he is made 
the agent of the law for that purpose, and, if the 
steps necessaary to precede his, action fail, he is not 
invested with legal right to make the sale; if one step 
fails, they all fail. The rule, therefore, is that all 
the preliminary requirements of the statute, made 
conditions to the exercise of the right and power to 
sell, and designating the various proceedings which 
culminate in the sale, must have been strictly com-
plied with. The officers who execute this power 
should follow the steps outlined for its exercise with 
precision. It is, a special jurisdiction and must be 
strictly pursued. As was said in Wister v. Kemmer-
er, 2 Yates 100, 'An exact and punctual adherence to 
the laws can alone divest the title of lands on a sale 
for nonpayment of taxes.' When the statutes govern-
ing the sale of lands for taxes direct an act to be done, 
or the manner, time, form, or place of doing it, such 
act must be done as prescribed, and the statutes must 
be strictly, if not literally, complied with." 
In Olsen v. Bagley, supra, the law is thus stated: 
"The title to be acquired under statutes author-
izing the sale of land for the nonpayment of taxes is 
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regarded as stricti juris, and whoever sets up a tax 
title must show that all the requirements of the law 
have been complied with." 
In Eastman v. Gurrey, supra, it is said: 
"In this case it was the duty of the plaintiff, as 
purchaser and holder of the tax deed, to show the 
regularity of all the proceedings. Bucknall v. Story, 
36 Cal. 67: Marx v. Hanthorn, 148, U. S. 172, 13 
Sup. Ct. 508." 
And again in Asper v. Moon, supra: 
"The requirements of the statute in this respect 
are essential, and the appellant has failed to show 
that they have been complied with." 
In the case of Davis v. Minnesota Baptist Convention, 
supra, is a very clear statement of the point. 
"It is also clear that, in the absence of a stat~te 
changing the rule, when a plaintiff in such a suit re-
lies upon a tax deed to establish a perfect title in him-
self, 'the validity of a tax-sale will not be presumed 
from the mere deed of the collector unaccompanied 
by proof of the prior proceedings and their validity. 
On the contrary, in the absence of an enabling stat-
ute, the burden is upon any person who claims title to 
land derived from a sale thereof for taxes to prove, 
affirmatively and by proper evidence, that every 
mandatory provision of the law under which the sale 
was effected was strictly complied with, that each 
step in the proceedings, from the assessment of the 
taxes to the execution of the deed, was formally and 
regularly taken by the officers or persons legally au-
thorized, and that he or his grantor was the purchas-
er at the sale.' 37 Cyc. 1452 and cases cited; 4 Cool-
ey's Law of Taxation (4th Ed.) 3024, Sec. 1550, and 
cases cited." 
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The jurisdictional requirements of a valid May sale, 
which under the authorities cited, must be affirmatively es-
tablished by the plaintiff in order to prevail in this action 
are: 
(a) A proper notice of the time and place of sale 
published in a newspaper having general circulation in the 
county. 
(b) That less than the entire tract was first offered 
for the amount of the taxes properly assessed. 
{c) That no sufficient bid was made for less than the 
whole of the property. 
(d) That the property was sold for the amount of the 
taxes properly assessed. 
The record of this case will be searched in vain for a 
single word of evidence tending to establish any of these 
indispensable requisites of a valid sale. Although a notice 
of sale was put into evidence there was no proof that it 
was published in a newspaper having general circula-
tion in the county, or that it was posted in five public 
places. The statute, of course, requires a public auction 
at which the property is offered to the best bidder. The 
best bidder is the one who offers the amount of the taxes 
plus interest, penalties, and cost for the smallest portion 
of the property. In this case the property consisted of 
several acres divided into two parcels each separately de-
scribe4. The County Commissioners were therefore re-
quired to first offer the parcels separately. Such is the 
very minimum requirement of the law. Only in the event 
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that no bid was made for either parcel could the Com-
missioners offer the entire property. Since the May sale 
is the procedure which cuts off the qualified estate of the 
owner (sometimes described as the right of redemption) 
it is a proceeding in invitum and no presumption can be 
indulged that the public officials performed their duties 
in conducting the sale. There being no affirmative proof 
that proper notice was given or that the sale was properly 
conducted there is a missing link in the plaintiff's chain 
of title. 
Not only is there an absence of proof of a valid sale, 
there is affirmative proof of a void sale. The amount of 
~· the taxes for the year 1933, including interest and penalties, 
for which the property was sold to Davis County, was the 
sum of $127.40. The property was sold to the plaintiff for 
the sum of $643.40. The difference between the two sums 
apparently represents the amount of taxes assessed subse-
quent to the year 1933, although there was no evidence 
showing the amount of these assessments. It was estab-
lished that the assessment of taxes subsequent to the year 
1933 was invalid. As pointed out in the statement of facts 
on the 7th day of December, 1933 James Farnworth con-
veyed to Alice Farnworth eighty acres of the property de-
'· 
.. ·· 
scribed as: 
"Beginning at the Northeast corner of Section 
34, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Me-
ridian, running thence South 22 5/7 rods, thence 
West to the Jordan River, thence northerly along the 
east bank of the Jordan River to the north line of 
Section 33, Township and Range aforesaid, thence 
East to the point of beginning," 
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the deed being recorded April 2, 1934. The record title to 
the rest of the property remained in James Farnworth. 
Notwithstanding the fact that James Farnworth appeared 
at all times to be the owner of record and whose address 
was known to the assessor, all of the property was, begin-
ning in the year 1934 and thereafter, assessed to Alice 
Farnworth. 
The statute (Section 80-5-12, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933) provides that if the name of the owner or claimant 
of any property is known to the assessor or if it appears 
of record in the office of the county recorder where the 
property is situated the property must be assessed to such 
name; if unknown to the assessor, and if it does not appear 
of record as aforesaid, the property must be assessed to un-
known owners. Section 80-5-4, R. S. Utah, 1933, provides 
that the county assessor must ascertain the names of all 
taxable inhabitants and all property in the county subject 
to taxation and must assess such property to the person 
by whom it was owned or claimed or in whose possession or 
control it was at 12:00 noon on the first day of January 
next preceding. No mistake in the name of the owner or 
supposed owner of property renders the assessment there-
of invalid. Construing these sections, this court in Tintic 
Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, supra, held that when 
the name of the owner appears of record in the office of the 
county recorder the property must be assessed to such 
person and that an assessment of property in the name of 
"A" when it stands on the record in the name of "B" is 
not a mistake in the name of the owner as that term is 
used in the statute. The court there said: 
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" ...... What then is the meaning of the italicized 
sentence about a 'mistake in the name'? Clearly, that 
means when the owner is unknown to the assessor 
and does not appear of record in the recorder's office, 
the property may be assessed to the claimant, or to 
the unknown owners and the claimant, or to the per-
son in possession. Or, if my property, which should 
be assessed to Martin M. Larson, was assessed to 
Martin A. Larson or perhaps to Morten M. Larson, 
that would be a mistake in the name of the owner 
which would not affect the validity of the assess-
ment. But to assess my property in the name of W. 
H. Folland is not a mistake in the name of the owner 
but is an assessment in the name of another person 
not the owner. The clause does not mention mistakes 
in the ownership, in the person who is the owner, 
but mistakes in the name of the owner." 
In that case the property was assessed in part to a 
stranger to the record owner. There were other errors, but 
the decision makes plain the point that an assessment of 
property in the name of "A" when the record title stands 
in the name of "B" is a void assessment. In the face of 
this decision and the prior cases above cited there is not 
the faintest basis for a contention that an assessment to 
Alice Farnworth of property standing upon the records in 
the name of James Farnworth is a mere mistake in the 
name of the owner. By the conveyance from James Farn-
worth to Alice Farnworth there was a segregation of the 
property into two parcels. It then became the duty of the 
assessor to assess one parcel to Alice Farnworth and the 
other parcel to James Farnworth. Instead of performing 
this duty, he assessed the entire property to Alice Farn-
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worth. The assessments were a nullity and could create no 
lien against the property. 
It being established that the assessments beginning 
with the year 1935 were void and that the county offered 
and sold the property for a sum including these illegal 
assessments, the only inquiry remaining is whether the sale 
is thereby rendered invalid. 
It is submitted that the decisions of this court and 
the plain intent of the statute require an affirmative answer 
to this question. It is expressly decided in the case of Utah 
Lead Company v. Piute County, supra, that a May sale 
conducted in the manner outlined in the statute is a con-
dition precedent to the right of the county to sell property 
which it has taken over for delinquent taxes. Such a sale 
is the only method of bringing about a forfeiture of the 
owner's qualified estate in the property. While one of the 
purposes of the May sale is to collect the taxes due and get 
the property back on the tax rolls, another equally obvious 
purpose is to protect the owner's interest by requiring the 
County Commissioners to offer and sell at public auction 
the smallest part of the property that will realize the amount 
of the taxes due. In other words, the purpose is to enable the 
county to collect the taxes due it with the least possible 
loss to the owner. Surely no one will contend that if the 
Commissioners sold a portion of the property for enough 
to pay the delinquent taxes the part unsold would remain 
the property of the county. Such a sale would operate as a 
redemption of the part not sold. The unsold portion would 
either remain in the owner or would revert to him by opera-
tion of law. 
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Since the May sale is simply a part of the procedure 
for the collection of taxes and since the county is required 
to sell the smallest portion of the property that will realize 
the amount of the taxes due, it would completely frustrate 
the evident purpose and intent of the statute if it should be 
held that the county could offer and sell the property for 
more than the amount of the taxes lawfully assessed. It 
would be equivalent to holding that the county can use the 
property which it acquires by auditor's deed for speculative 
purposes. Since the county holds the property solely for 
collecting the taxes and is required to collect those taxes 
out of ·the smallest parcel, it inevitably follows that a sale 
for more than the taxes actually due is in violation of law 
and transfers no title to the purchaser. 
There is and can be no distinction between the case at 
bar and the case where the invalid assessment was levied 
prior to the issuance of the certificate of sale. It is true 
that in the latter case the County has no title whatever at 
the time of the May sale, whereas in the present case we 
are assuming that the certificate of sale and the auditor's 
deed are valid. In either situation the property· is sold for 
taxes that are not due which is the thing the statute does 
not permit. 
It is inaccurate to say that the county under the 1933 
statute acquires the title or ownership of the property by 
virtue of the certificate of sale and a~ditor's deed. What 
it actually acquires is merely a lien for the taxes that are 
due. It is only by virtue of a valid May sale that it acquires 
any greater estate. 
That a tax sale of property is void if the property is 
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sold for more than the amount of taxes lawfully assessed 
has long been the settled law of every jurisdiction where the 
question has arisen. In Hodgkin v. Boswell, supra, the plain-
tiff sought to set aside a tax deed to the defendant and 
quiet title. The sale under which the defendant claimed 
was made for delinquent taxes for the years 1895, 1896, 
1897, 1898 and 1899. In the years 1895 and 1896 the prop-
erty was assessed to the plaintiff under his correct name, 
Frank E. Hodgkin. In the remaining years it was assessed 
to F. E. Hodgkins. The sale was a lump sum for all taxes. 
The statute of Oregon like our own required the property 
to be assessed in the name of the owner. The Supreme Court 
of Oregon held that the assessments in the name of F. E. 
Hodgkins were void, and since the sale was for taxes which 
were in part illegally assessed it was void and the purchaser 
acquired no title. The following quotation is made from the 
opinion: 
"It is true that for two years (1895 and 1896) 
the property appears to have been assessed against 
plaintiff under his correct name; but, where legal 
and illegal items are grouped together in a single sale, 
the whole sale is void on account of the excessive 
levy. We quote from Cooley on Taxation (2d Ed.) p. 
497: 'It has been shown in a preceding chapter that 
an excessive levy is void, whether it is made excessive 
by including with lawful taxes those. which are un-
lawful, or in any other manner. If the levy would be 
void, there would, of course, be nothing to uphold a 
sale. And, if a valid levy were to be increased after-
wards by unlawful additions, the sale would be equal-
ly bad. The statutory power is a power to sell for 
lawful taxes and lawful expenses, and, if it is ex-
ceeded by including unlawful items of either class, 
the power is exceeded, and its exercise is invalid in 
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toto from the manifest impossibility of saving the 
sale in part when the invalidity extends to the whole. 
It is to be presumed, when the sale has been made for 
a sum in part illegal, that some undefined and unde-
finable portion of the land has gone to satisfy an il-
legal demand, and that such part would not have been 
sold at all if only what was lawful had been called 
for.'" 
In Gage v. Pumpelly, supra, the statute provided that 
the owner of property should have a certain period to redeem 
after the sale of the property. The county court having 
jurisdiction ordered the property sold for delinquent taxes 
which it found to be due and the property was pursuant 
to the judgment sold. Part of the taxes for which the county 
court ordered the property sold had not in fact been prop-
erly assessed. The Supreme Court held that under the con-
trolling decisions of the State the sale was void. We quote 
from the opinion : 
"But the latest adjudication by the State court 
of the question under consideration was Riverside 
Co. v. Howell, 113 Ill. 259. That was ejectment for 
the recovery of land, the defendant claiming title un-
der a tax deed based upon a judgment of the County 
Court. The validity of the sale was questioned upon 
the ground, among others, that a part of the taxes, 
for the non-payment of which the sale was ordered, 
were illegal and void. The argument was made there, 
as in this case, that the judgment of the County 
Court was conclusive as to all matters that could, or 
ougbt to have been, passed upon in rendering it, and 
if it included too much taxes., or illegal taxes, it was 
only error to be remedied by appeal. But the court, 
finding that certain taxes included in the judgment 
were invalid, held that no title passed by the sale, 
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observing that 'the authorities are to the effect, that 
when a part of the tax for which a sale of real estate 
is made is illegal, the sale is void,' citing M.cLaughlin 
v. Thompson, 55 Ill. 249; Kemper v. M cClelmnd's 
Lessee, 19 Ohio, 308; Gamble v. Witty, 55 Miss. 26; 
Cooley on Taxation, 295, 296; Hardenburg v. Kidd, 
10 Cal. 402." 
The proposition has been fully adopted in this juris. 
diction by the decision in Asper v. Moon, supra, wherein a 
partially invalid assessment was involved. The sale included 
the amount of the invalid assessment and it was held that 
it was void. Although there were other objections to the 
assessment, the court expressly decided that the partial 
invftlidity of the assessment nuilified the sale. The decision 
concludes thus : 
" ...... And as one of the lots was wrongfully as-
sessed, and the amount of such assessment was not 
deducted from the amount of the assessment for 
which the lots classified with said lot were offered 
for sale and sold the sale of said lots was void, under 
said decisions." 
It appears from the tax deed that the amount of the 
delinquent taxes including penalties, interest and costs on 
the date of the May sale was $643.40. Apparently, the 
amount bid by the plaintiff was $656.30. He introduced 
in evidence his check to Davis County for the last stated 
amount as evidence of the amount bid at the sale. If the 
recitals in the deed are correct, then the property was sold 
for more than the amount of taxes, penalties, interest and 
costs, even if all assessments were regular and valid. No 
attempt was made to show how much taxes were actually 
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due and there was nothing to indicate that the recital of 
the amount of taxes in the deed to the plaintiff was incor-
rect. It is thus conclusively demonstrated that the prop-
erty was sold for more than the amount of taxes due even 
if it be assumed that all assessments are valid. This, as we 
have shown above is in violation of the statute and renders 
the sale void. 
III. THE COUNTY AUDITOR IS WITHOUT 
POWER TO EXECUTE A DEED ON BEHALF OF THE 
COUNTY TO A PURCHASER AT THE MAY SALE AND 
A DEED SO EXECUTED CONVEYS NOTHING. 
Mathews v. Blake, 92 P. 242. 
Sayre v. Sage, 108 P. 160. 
Macbeth v. Stunkard, 164 N. E. 711. 
At the time the tax deed to the plaintiff was issued the 
statute (80-10-68, Session Laws of Utah, 1933) provided 
that when property has been sold at the May sale the 
County Clerk is authorized to execute deeds in the name of 
the county and attest the same by his seal vesting in the pur-
chaser all of the title of the State, of the county, and of 
each city, town, school or other taxing district interest in 
~c the real estate so sold. No deed so executed is to be found 
in the record nor is there any deed which by any rules of con-
struction could be said to be in even substantial compliance 
with this statute. On the contrary, the deed under which 
the plaintiff claims is executed by the auditor of Davis 
County and is acknowledged and attested by such auditor. 
r- It might be noted in passing that the statute referred to 
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was amended so as to authorize the auditor to execute the 
deed on behalf of the county and provides form of such 
deed. The amendment, however, did not go into effect 
until long after the deed to the plaintiff was issued. It is 
thus apparent that the county auditor had no more power 
or authority to execute the deed under which the plaintiff 
claims than an ordinary private citizen would have. It 
was as ineffectual to vest any title in plaintiff as a blank 
piece of paper. No rule of tax title law is more firmly 
established than the one which announces that a public 
{)fficial who executes a tax deed on behalf of the county 
or state acts under a naked power and cannot divest either 
the county or the owner of any interest in the property ex-
eept by an exact compliance with the statute creating the 
power. In Macbeth v. Stunkard, supra, the plaintiff claimed 
under a tax deed. The statute required that tax deeds shall 
be executed by the county auditor under his hand and seal 
and witnessed by the county treasurer and acknowledged 
before the county recorder or any other officer authorized 
to take acknowledgments. The certificate of acknowledg-
ment annexed to the deed under which the plaintiff claimed 
title recited that the deed was acknowledged by the county 
auditor before George E. Hubbard who signed the certifi-
cate without indicating that he was an officer of any kind. 
The opinion says : 
" ...... So far as the tax deed and the certificate of 
acknowledgment are concerned, there is. nothing to 
indicate that Hubbard was authorized to take the ac-
knowledgment. The deed, not being acknowledged as 
required by law, was not entitled to be recorded. Not 
being executed as required by the statute, it was 
neither prima facie evidence of the regularity of the 
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sale and the prior proceedings, nor was it prima facie, 
evidence of a good and valid title in the grantee 
named in the deed. We hold the tax deed was invalid, 
in so far as it attempted to convey any title to Agnes 
Donahey." 
In Mathews v. Blake, supra, the tax deed involved pur-
ported to be signed by the treasurer of the county and ack-
nowledged before a notary public. The statute required it 
to be acknowledged by the treasurer before the clerk of the 
District Court. The Supreme Court of Wyoming held that 
such a deed was void and was not even admissible in evi-
dence to show color of title under the adverse possession 
statute. 
" ...... Where the statute directs the execution of a 
deed by a public officer, and requires it to be executed 
in a particular manner and to be witnessed or ac-
knowledged before a particular officer, the witness-
ing or acknow I edging of the deed in that manner is 
a part of its execution, and without such witnessing 
or acknowledgment is void upon its face. The rule is 
stated in Black on Tax Titles, Section 208, as follows: 
'A rule of primary importance is that the execution 
of a tax deed must conform strictly to the statute; 
that is, any directions which the law may give in re-
gard to its signature, seal, witnesses, or acknowledg-
ment must be duly complied with, or the conveyance 
will be invalidated. Thus, if the act requires that tax 
deeds shall be authenticated by the addition of the 
seal of the county, and this be omitted, the deed will 
be void ; nor will it even be admissible to show color 
of title under the special limitation of the revenue 
act.' It was held in Reed v. Merriam, 15 Neb. 323, 18 
N. W. 137, that, 'whatever may have been the object 
of the Legislature in requiring the treasurer to at-
test the execution of a tax deed by his seal, the pro-
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vision is one that cannot be dispensed with, and the 
want of a seal is no valid excuse. A treasurer acts 
under a naked statutory power in executing a tax 
deed, and, unless he comply with the provisions of 
the statute, the deed will be void.' " 
In Sayre v. Sage, supra, the statute required the tax 
deed to be attested by the official or private seal of the 
treasurer. The deed in question bore no such seal and the 
Supreme Court of Colorado held it to be void. 
" ...... The treasurer, in executing such deed, acts 
under a naked statutory power, and in order that it 
shall be valid, it must comply substantially with the 
provisions of the statute prescribing its form. That 
it must be attested by the official or private seal of 
the treasurer is a positive requirement of the statute, 
and is as necessary to its validity as any other. With-
out one or the other of the seals specified it is void. 
Sutton v. Young, 4 Neb. 319; Deputron v. Young, 134 
U. S. 241, 10 Sup. Ct. 539, 33 L. Ed. 923; Gue v. Jones, 
25 Neb. 634,41 N. W. 555; Reed v. Merriam, 15 Neb. 
323, 18 N. W. 137; Gage v. Starkweather, 103 Ill. 
559 ; Reed v. Morse, 51 Kan. 141, 32 Pac. 900." 
The deed in question having been executed by an offi-
cer without authority to do so was wholly ineffectual to 
vest any title whatever in the plaintiff. It was as ineffectual 
as it would be if executed by the plaintiff's attorney. 
In the remaining pages of this brief we shall assume 
for the purpose of argument that all of the proceedings 
leading up to the tax deed issued to the plaintiff were in 
all respects regular and in strict conformity with the statute. 
We shall assume further that plaintiff acquired an apparent 
title under his deed. Upon these assumptions we will now 
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endeavor to demonstrate that whatever title plaintiff ac-
quired at the tax sale must be decreed to be held by him 
as a trustee and is not such title as will divest the appellants 
of their interests in the property. In other words, the 
payment made by the plaintiff to Davis County and the 
issuance of the deed were a mere redemption from the 
delinquent tax sales. 
IV. THE PURCHASE BY THE PLAINTIFF OF 
THE PROPERTY AT THE MAY SALE WAS MADE 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEFRAUDING THE APPEL-
LANTS OF THEIR INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY AND 
-- THEREFORE OPERATED SIMPLY ASAREDEMPTION. 
IS 
Guldner v. Guldner, 203 N. W. 289. 
Adams v. Snyder, 20 P. (2) 827. 
Blotcky v. Solberman, 281 N. W. 496. 
Fair v. Brown, 40 Iowa 209. 
Turner v. Edwards, 292 N. W. 257. 
First Congregational Church v. Terry, 107 N. 
w. 305 
Adams v. Snyder, 20 P. (2) 827. 
Quinby v. Meyer, 148 So. 869. 
Riley v. Bank, 23 P. (2) 362. 
Baird v. Fischer, 220 N. W. 892. 
Des Moines Bank v. Eisenmenger, 235 N. W. 390. 
Norton v. Myers, 77 N. W. 298. 
Chrisman v. Hough, 47 S. W. 941. 
McCready v. Fredericksen, 41 Utah 388, 126 P. 
316. 
McAlpine v. Zitser, 10 N. E. 901. 
~ It is impossible to read the evidence even in the most 
~· casual manner without being at once convinced that the 
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purchase of this property by the plaintiff was the final act 
of a conspiracy to deprive the appellants of their interests 
therein. The participants in the scheme were the defendant 
Alice F'arnworth, her attorney, D. A. Skeen, and the plain-
tiff. The defendant Alice Farnworth had previously at-
temped to forfeit the interests of the Jensens created by 
the exchange agreement between her and them. She then 
decided to resort to the old and familiar device of cutting 
off bothersome liens by acquiring a tax title. She realized, 
of course, that she could not acquire the tax title in her 
own name. Accordingly, she appealed to her old and trusted 
friend, the plaintiff. She informed him that she was about 
to lose this property and beseeched him for aid. She pre-
vailed upon him to go to the office of fier attorney who 
likewise was a friend of the plaintiff. Here in this con-
ference the details of the plan were worked out. It was 
decided that the plaintiff should bid in the property and hold 
it for the benefit of Farnworth and Skeen. It is true that 
the plaintiff did not expressly state in his testimony that 
he agreed to bid in and hold the property for the benefit 
of Farnworth and Skeen, but the undisputed facts and his 
admissions establish that agreement beyond any reasonable 
doubt. Those facts and admissions likewise establish with 
certainty that Farnworth and Skeen agreed to protect and 
save the plaintiff harmless should the tax title fail and that 
if it should be upheld the property would be either recon-
veyed to Farnworth and Skeen or sold and the proceeds 
divided among them. It it not necessary to resort to any 
inferences to discover that the arrangement and plan were 
as above outlined. 
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In the first place Skeen was Mrs. Farnworth's at-
torney at the time the property was bid in and had been 
such for a number of years. She was indebted to him for 
legal services and the mortgage which he set up in this action 
was given to secure payment for those services. He was 
likewise the attorney and friend of the plaintiff. He pre-
pared the complaint in this action. She is the one who 
agreed to pay Skeen for preparing this complaint and 
~ clearing the title. Skeen undertook to clear the title without 
any obligation whatever being incurred by the plaintiff. 
Under this arrangement it is most natural that we would 
expect the defendants Farnworth and Skeen to default in 
the action. That is precisely what they did. It is impos-
sible to overestimate the significance of these defaults. It 
indicates the fullest cooperation with the plaintiff. While 
nominally named as defendants they are in reality plain-
tiffs. If the plaintiff in this action purchased this property 
for his own use and benefit why should he call upon the 
attorney of Mrs. Farnworth to prepare this complaint and 
why should Mr. Skeen prepare this complaint without any 
charge whatever to the plaintiff? The plaintiff insisted 
.. in his testimony that he purchased this property at the 
urgent solicitation of the defendant Alice Farnworth and 
D. A. Skeen and that he bid in the property solely for the 
;... purpose of protecting them. 
"Q. And you bid it in at his solicitation and at 
his request and at the request of Mrs. Alice Farn-
worth? That is true isn't it? 
"A. Well, not absolutely. I wouldn't say a re-
quest. They solicited me and wanted me to. 
"Q. Mr. Skeen and Mrs. Farnworth solicited 
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you and prevailed upon you to come with her and bid 
in this property at the sale? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you bid it in to protect Mrs. Alice 
Farnworth and Mr. Skeen, didn't you? 
"A. Not Mr. Skeen particularly at all. 
"Q. All right, we will make it Mrs. Farnworth. 
That is correct isn't it? 
"A. Yes. I might say this, Mr. Bagley, as you 
have in your deposition there, that I first made this 
first loan down on the Sugarhouse property. I be-
came very well acquainted with those people ..... . 
and my sympathy rather went out to the family as 
they told me about their condition, and so on, and 
when this situation came along they told me about 
their going to lose this property out here in Davis 
County and they solicited me and wanted me to help 
them out, and I told them no, that I wasn't interested 
and the son came down a number of times and tried 
to get me to help him out, and I finally told him that 
I would rather not. He then wanted to know if I 
wouldn't come up to the office and talk it over with 
he and Mr. Skeen, so I went up and talked the situa-
tion all through with Mr. Skeen and him and I fin-
ally decided that I wouid help them out in doing so. 
And in our conversation I told Mr. Skeen and Mr. 
Farnworth as I told Mr. Farnworth before at my own 
office that I was only doing it because of the interest 
and my sympathy went out to them and I would like 
to help them if I could. And I told Mr. Skeen the 
same thing." 
He then discussed with Mr. Skeen the matter of the fee 
owing by the Farnworths to Skeen. 
"And I told him that my interest was simply to see 
that they were protected all the way through, the 
Farnworths, and that he would be fair in taking care 
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of the account and whatever came he would be fair 
in taking care of the account with Mr. Farnworth." 
"Q. Now, if you should prevail in this action, 
of course you have no intention of depriving lV,Ir. 
Skeen of his mortgage lien on the property have 
you? 
"A. Oh, no, no. 
"Q. And you have no intention of depriving 
Mrs. Farnworth of any interest that she has in the 
property? 
"A. Why, no. 
"Q. In other words, you bid in this property to 
protect them and to help them out, didn't you? 
"A. Yes. I did it as an accommodation all the 
way through to clear the property and make a satis-
factory arrangement to everybody." 
Of course, this testimony completely eliminates any 
thought or suggestion that the plaintiff bid in the property 
for any purpose other than for the use and benefit of 
Farnworth and Skeen. By these statements and admis-
sions he completely strips himself of the character of a 
good-faith bidder at a tax sale. Whether by this testimony 
-· he clothes himself with the robes of a trustee or those of 
a mere agent it is not necessary to determine. The law 
fastens one or the other status upon him because he par-
-· ticipated in a fraudulent device. He made himself a party 
~ 
to the scheme of Farnworth and Skeen to cut off the 
rights of appellants in this property. The plaintiff repeated-
ly speaks of protecting the interests of Farnworth and Skeen. 
What did the interests of Farnworth and Skeen need pro-
tection against? Certainly they would have no interest 
~ to protect if the plaintiff bid in the property for himself. 
a.: Assuming the tax sale to be valid, if the plaintiff became 
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a purchaser in his own right, everybody would be cut off. 
It is apparent that Farnworth and Skeen needed protection 
against the outstanding and superior title and lien of the 
appellants. The result of the plaintiff's admissions, there-
fore, is that he purchased this property for the purpose of 
freeing it from the appellants' interests and thus protect 
Farnworth and Skeen. Farnworth employed Skeen to pre-
pare the complaint which would clear the title. It is self-
evident, therefore, that when the plaintiff speaks of clear-
ing the title he means clearing it of the claims of the appel-
lant. The purpose of clearing the title was to protect Farn-
worth and Skeen. 
If Farnworth or Skeen had furnished the money to 
the plaintiff to bid in the property no court would hesitate 
a moment to hold that the transaction was a mere redemption 
from the tax sale. What actually took place in this case is 
exactly equivalent to that supposition. Skeen agreed with 
the plaintiff to take the property over as soon as the 
plaintiff bid it in. 
The latter testified: 
"A. As a matter of fact, Mr. Bagley, Mr. Skeen 
assured me he would take it off my hands. 
"Q. Mr. D. A. Skeen assured you that he will 
protect you and take this property that you bid in at 
the sale off your hands? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. That was the understanding? 
"A. That was the fact in the case, Mr. Bag-
ley." 
As a matter of fact, on the same day that plaintiff bid in 
the property he and Skeen entered into a written agreement 
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whereby Skeen undertook to purchase the property. While 
this written agreement contains language appropriate to 
an option it is clear that it was the intention of the parties 
to enter into a binding agreement and that such is the legal 
effect to be given to the instrument. But whether this 
document incorporates binding agreement or not is im-
material, for the evidence, as we have pointed out, clearly 
shows that there was an understanding and oral agreement 
between the plaintiff and Skeen whereby the latter should 
take over the property after it had been bid in by the 
plaintiff. 
The written agreement referred to is a most significant 
document and itself reveals the attempt of the parties to 
obscure the conspiracy that existed to deprive the appel-
lants of their rights in the property. In the first place, the 
date of the instrument has been altered. 'The date when it 
was actually entered into and the date which it originally 
bore is May 15th. The "15" is obliterated and the figures 
"22nd" inserted in lieu thereof. The date of its acceptance 
by the plaintiff is May 15th. It recites: "I (Skeen) un-
derstand you have purchased the property ... at the May 
tax sale ... I have not checked the tax proceedings." 
- As a matter of fact, Skeen knew that plaintiff had pur-
chased the property at the May sale because he accom-
panied the plaintiff to Farmington and was present when 
the latter bid in the property. The plaintiff testified that 
· · Skeen examined the tax proceedings before the bid was made 
and assured the plaintiff that they were regular and in 
:~ due form. Although Skeen was present in court when the 
plaintiff gave his testimony as above he did not undertake ~~: 
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to deny it or qualify it in any way. Skeen further says in 
the agreement that he was not in a position to purchase the 
property at the tax sale. At a later point in this brief 
we will make it perfectly clear just why Skeen was not in 
a position to bid in the property himself. He then gracious-
ly undertakes to institute and prosecute for the plaintiff 
any action necessary to quiet title to the property in con-
sideration of plaintiff giving a first and prior option to 
purchase the property, "in order that I might realize on 
my mortgage." The amount of the purchase price fixed in 
the agreement is the exact amount of the bid made by the 
plaintiff with interest and expenses added. Skeen apparently 
later discovered that the amount of the expenses should 
be fixed in a minimum amount in order to make it appear 
that the plaintiff was making a profit in selling the prop-
erty. He therefore inserted the words in his own hand-
writing "not less than $50.00" after the word "expenses." 
It will be observed from the agreement that Skeen pro-
poses to bring a suit to quiet title in the plaintiff notwith-
standing he assumes that the tax pro.ceedings are valid 
and vested in the plaintiff the title free and clear of all 
liens, judgments, etc. We have heretofore demonstrated 
that there was no occasion to bring any suit to quiet title 
as against Mrs. Farnworth and surely Skeen would not 
propose to quiet title against himself. The proposal to 
quiet title, therefore, was to eliminate the appellants. As 
stated in the agreement Skeen was "not in a position to 
purchase the property at tax sale myself" because being 
a lawyer he was familiar with the well-established rule 
that a junior lienholder cannot cut off a prior lien by the 
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device of bidding in the encumbered property at a tax 
sale. He knew that in such cases "equity will relieve against 
such oppression and teach the grasping creditor modera-
tion in his demands and that he cannot destroy others to 
build up his own fortunes." See Fair v. B1·own, 40 Iowa 
209; Quinby v. Meyer, 148 So. 869; Riley v. Bank, 23 P (2) 
362; Baird v. Fischer, 220 N. W. 892; Des Moines Bank v. 
Eisenmenger, 235 N. W. 390; Norton v. Myers, 77 N. W. 
298; Chrisman v. Hough, 47 S. W. 941; McCready v. Fred-
ericksen, 41 Utah 388, 126 P. 316. He therefore undertakes 
to bring the suit to quiet title in the name of the plaintiff 
in order to eliminate the appellants and after thus puri-
fying the title, take over the property from the plaintiff. 
It is not possible to reconcile the purchase of this tax 
title by the plaintiff upon any reasonable theory of a good-
faith bidder. He bought the property at the urgent solici-
tation of Farnworth and Skeen after the former had told 
him that she was,about to lose her interest in the property. 
He bought it for the avowed purpose of protecting their 
interests against the danger of loss which was threatened 
r by the judgment against her and the exchange agreement 
1!. which she made with the J ens ens. He agreed with them that 
:£ after acquiring the tax title he would clear off the outstand-
'"~ ing interests and reconvey the property to Mrs. Farnworth's 
:'
5 attorney for her and his benefit. Mrs. Farnworth's attorney 
c: went with the plaintiff to bid in the property. He examined 
~ the tax proceedings leading up to the sale and he advised the 
8 plaintiff to make the purchase. Skeen prepared the com-
j: plaint in this action. He did so without charge to the plain~ 
~: tiff. The cost of the litigation was to be borne by Mrs. Farn-
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worth and Skeen. Skeen made himself a party to the action 
along with Mrs. Farnworth for the obvious purpose of 
making it appear that the plaintiff was the real owner of 
the property and claiming it adversely to them. Of course, 
they made default as everyone fully understood they would 
do. So far as the action to quiet title against Farnworth 
and Skeen was concerned it was a fictitious. and collusive 
proceeding. It was a mere form to give the appearance of 
solemnity to what in reality was a sham. It was just a step 
in the scheme to deprive the appellants of their rights. The 
authorities condemn such a scheme and strike down the ap-
parent title thus acquired. In Turner v. Edwards, supra, 
the plaintiff purchased property at a tax sale. Her mother 
was the life tenant, the remainder-over being vested in the 
children of the decedent by a former marriage. The life 
tenant failed to pay the taxes and the plaintiff purchased 
the property with her own money. Plaintiff brought suit 
to quiet her title and the remaindermen claimed that there 
was collusion between the plaintiff and her mother, the life 
tenant, to have the plaintiff bid in the property. There was 
evidence that soon after the period for redemption had ex-
pired the life tenant attempted to sell the property. This 
fact, together with the fact that the plaintiff was the 
daughter of the life tenant, was sufficient to show that the 
purchase of the property by the plaintiff was the result of 
a collusive arrangement. The court said: 
"Collusion is a secret agreement and co-opera-
tion for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose. Webster's 
New International Dictionary (2d) 1935. It implies 
a secret understanding whereby one party plays into 
another's hands for fraudulent purposes. W. E. Bow-
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en Improvement Co. v. Van Hafften, 209 Mo. App. 
629, 238 S. W. 147; Brainerd Dispatch Newspaper 
Co. v. County of Crow Wing, 196 Minn. 194, 264 N. 
W. 779, 780; Lindstrom v. National Life Ins. Co. of 
United States, 84 Or. 588, 165 P. 675, 677. In its 
legal significance it involves an agreement between 
two or more persons to defraud another of his rights 
by forms of law or to obtain an object forbidden by 
law. Burt v. Clague, 183 Minn. 109, 235 N. W. 620. 
It is a general rule that fraud renders voidable every-
thing into which it enters. The court will look 
through any form of instrument or proceedings, no 
matter how solemn, in order to prevent a party from 
profiting by his own fraud. It is immaterial that he 
has conformed to all the formal requirements of the 
law. 3 Dunnell, Minn. Dig., 2d Ed. & 1937 Supp., 
section 3834; Baart v. Martin, 99 Minn. 197, 108 N. 
w. 945." 
In Adams v. Snyfkr, supra, the plaintiff brought suit 
_ to foreclose a mortgage executed by Rudolph Snyder, who 
_ was a son-in-law of S. J. Eisberg, who later became the 
owner of the property. S. J. Eisberg conveyed the property 
to his brother, S. N. Eisberg, who in turn conveyed it to a 
corporation of which S. J. Eisberg was president. Still 
later the corporation conveyed to S. N. Eisberg and M. J. 
_ Eisberg, brothers of S. J. Eisberg. The taxes were allowed 
to become delinquent and the county brought suit to fore-
close the tax lien and the property was sold to Strauss, · 
a brother-in-law of M. J. Eisberg. S. J. Eisberg was a 
bidder at the sale. Strauss bid $441.67 in excess of the 
taxes and costs. As soon as Strauss acquired title at the ~~ ~~ tax sale M. J. and S. N. Eisberg conveyed the property 
.~ by quitclaim deed to him. Strauss bid in the property 
·.~· with his own funds and there was no evidence that there 
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was any agreement between him and the Eisbergs that 
Strauss would reconvey the property to them or that he 
would protect their interests. Plaintiff claimed that there 
was fraud and collusion between Strauss and the Eisbergs 
to defeat her mortgage. The court found such collusion to 
exist from the fact that the Eisbergs had prevailed upon 
Strauss, who was their relative, to bid in the property, and 
that Strauss knew that the Eisbergs were endeavoring to 
free the property from the lien of the plaintiff's mortgage. 
The court said : 
"The facts and circumstances already set forth 
strongly tend to show collusion clear down to the 
purchas·e at the tax sale. It was. a family affair, and 
all appear to have cooperated to the same end, that is, 
to defeat the mortgage, but only Strauss had the 
hardihood to defend against the charge and the incul-
pating facts and circumstances alleged and shown. 
The different steps of action and inaction manifestly 
point to the same purpose, the defeat of plaintiff's 
mortgage, even to the care taken to have competi-
tion among thems.elves at the sale and thus giving 
it the appearance of innocence and validity. It is said 
that there is no direct evidence that defendants com-
bined for the illegal purpose. Conspiracy to defraud 
cannot always be shown by direct evidence. Those en-
gaged in a conspiracy to defraud rarely admit the 
common purpose, but in such cases circumstantial 
evidence suffices. When there is collusion, each of 
the parties charged evincing a knowledge and ap-
proval of the acts. of the others, all in furtherance of 
the conspiracy, proof of the s.eparate acts of several 
persons may be shown, and it has been said: 'The 
greater the secrecy that is observed regarding the 
object of s.uch concurrence, the stronger is the evi-
dence of conspiracy.' 5 R. C. L. 1104." 
I  
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In Guldner v. Guldner, supra, the plaintiff brought 
suit to set aside a tax deed issued to Jacob Guldner. She 
had been married to Hugo Guldner, brother of Jacob, but 
obtained a divorce from him. In the divorce decree the 
plaintiff was awarded two-thirds interest in the property 
with the right to use and occupy all of the property and re-
ceive all of the rents and income therefrom as long as she 
lived. The other one-third was awarded to Hugo; that is, 
he retained such one-third interest by the decree. A short 
time before the decree was entered the property was sold 
for delinquent taxeS. It was bid in by Peck who was an at-
torney connected with the firm of attorneys. representing 
Jacob Guldner. The latter furnished Peck with the money to 
bid in the property. Jacob took an assignment of the cer-
tificate of sale and shortly after the divorce was granted ac-
quired the tax deed. It appeared that plaintiff and her hus-
band had been having trouble before the divorce was 
granted and Jacob knew of this trouble. Hugo had falsely 
informed his wife at the time of the divorce that the taxes 
had been paid, although there was no evidence that Jacob 
knew of the false representation made by Hugo. There was 
no evidence whatever that Hugo furnished Jacob the money 
which the latter gave to Peck to bid in the property, and 
there was no evidence of any agreement on the part of Jacob 
to reconvey the property to Hugo. N otwiths.tanding the ab-
sence of such direct evidence the court found that there was 
collusion between Hugo and Jacob to deprive the plaintiff 
of her interest in the property. We quote from the opinion : 
"Jacob Guldner was conversant with the family 
relations between Hugo Guldner and his wife, and 
their troubles. The association of these two brothers 
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for some time prior to the divorce proceedings was 
intimate. It seems that Jacob ran a restaurant, and 
Hugo boarded with him most of the time. Jacob 
Guldner never, at any time prior to the service of 
his notice on the wife to dispossess her, advised her 
about his owning the tax deed. He made no effort to 
serve a notice on her of the taking of the tax deed, 
and another peculiar circumstance is that his brother 
moved out of said property about three days after 
Jacob Guldner had served notice on him with refer-
ence to the deed. 
"The tax certificate, when it was originally is-
sued, was issued to G. H. Peck, who was an attorney 
connected with the firm of attorneys representing 
Jacob Guldner. It is shown by the evidence that 
Peck at no time had an money with which to purchase 
tax deeds, and we are quite satisfied from the record 
that the deed was in fact purchased for and at the 
instance of Jacob Guldner. We are further satisfied 
from the record that there was a secret understand-
ing between Jacob Guldner and his brother Hugo, and 
that they combined to defeat this. woman of her 
rights in the property. 
"The whole record in this case abundantly satis· 
fied us that the appellee was wholly ignorant of the 
exact situation as it relates to this tax sale, and that 
her husband lulled her into security. while the brother 
Jacob carefully refrained and secreted from her the 
knowledge of his relation to the property and his re-
lation to this tax sale. The action of the appellant 
Jacob Guldner seems to us not to have been in good 
faith .... 
"Of course, fraud in the procurement of the tax 
deed will always be available as a basis for equitable 
relief. Connolly v. Connolly, 63 Iowa, 202, 18 N. W. 
868; Leas v. Garverich, 77 Iowa, 275, 42 N. W. 194. 
It need not be actual fraud, but may be constt:uctive 
fraud. First Congregational Church v. Terry, 130 
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Iowa, 513, 107 N. W. 305, 114 Am. St. Rep. 443; 
Ellsworth v. Cordrey, 63 Iowa 675, 16 N. W. 211; 
Dohms v. Mann, 76 Iowa 723, 39 N. W. 823; Lynn v. 
Morse, 76 Iowa 665, 39 N. W. 203. 
"Close family ties, intimate associations, or ac-
tual trust and confidence, are also matters that 
should be considered in cases of this kind. Lampman 
v. Lampman, 118 Iowa 140, 91 N. W. 1042; Betten-
dorf v. Bettendorf, 190 Iowa 83, 179 N. W. 444, 945.'' 
In the case of First Congregational Church v. T,erry~ 
107 N. W. 305, 114 A. St. Rep. 443, a testatrix had devised 
a tract of land to her brother for life with remainder to the 
plaintiff church. The life tenant allowed the taxes to be-
come delinquent and the property was bought in at tax sale 
by one Terry, a friend of the life tenant. Terry conveyed 
the land to Park, who on the same day in turn conveyed it to 
the wife of the life tenant and to her children. The remain-
derman brought suit to cancel the tax deeds. The tax deeds 
were held to be merely a redemption of the taxes. The court 
said: 
" ...... Collusive and fraudulent agreements are not 
often made in the presence of persons other than 
those participating in the fraud. In the nature of 
things they are difficult to prove by direct evidence, 
and must be established in whole or in part by proof 
of collateral circumstances. They are carried on un-
der the cover of secrecy, and the participants are 
rarely found to be frank and candid witnesses. And 
while, generally speaking, fraud is not to be pre-
sumed, yet when all the circumstances combined pre-
sent a showing that can be reconciled with no reason-
able theory nf good faith, courts will not hesitate to 
place the stamp of invalidity upon the transaction. 
In the case before us a careful examination of the 
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abstracts and of the transcript convinces us beyond 
all doubt that the acquiring of the tax title was 
brought abo:ut by a wrongful and collusive arrang~ 
ment between the life tenant, Edward J. Hale, his 
wife, Elsie J. Hale, his .father in law, Park, and their 
mutual friend and confident, Terry, with the ex-
press purpose and object of eliminating the interests 
of the remaindermen. 
"We shall not extend the opinion to state the 
testimony at length. It is enough to say that soon 
after coming into the life estate Hale began to seek 
the help of a friend to procure a tax title to the land, 
and circumstances demonstrate that Terry, an old 
and intimate acquaintance, was complaisant enough 
to serve his purpose. Hale left the tax of 1896, a mat-
ter of some twelve dollars, to become delinquent. At 
the treasurer's sale Terry, who never before or since 
purchased a piece of land for taxes, bought it in. 
Within a few days after the deed was procured he i 
conveyed the property, worth one thousand to fif-
teen hundred dollars, to Park for the amount of his 
investment in it, less than one hundred dollars, and 
immediately and as a part of the same transaction 
and pursuant to Terry's request Park conveyed it to 
Hale's wife .and children. Terry said that he knew 
the condition of the title and that from the outset he 
intended to do just what he did do; that is, obtain 
a tax title and transfer it to Hale's family. Whether 
Park was a party to the arrangement originally, or 
was called in later to serve as a conduit through 
which to pass the title from the purchaser to the 
Hales and thereby add to the difficulty of tracing the 
fraud, is immaterial. He does not pretend to have 
taken the title for any other purpose than to give the 
benefit of it to his daughter and her family. While 
Terry swears that he never mentioned to Hale the 
matter of his purchase of the land for taxes, it must 
be presumed that Hale knew perfectly well what was 
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going on in this respect. Notice of the impending 
conveyance by the treasurer was served upon him, 
and, if he did not rest in the certainty that the cer-
tificate ·was in the hands of a friend on whom he 
could rely, it is incredible that he would permit this 
valuable property which furnished him home and 
shelter for life to pass from his hands for the trifling 
sum required to redeem it. Terry's story is broken, 
halting, and incoherent, and in every line betrays 
confusion not unusual in a witness who will not wil-
lingly tell an untruth, but finds perfect frankness 
embarrasing. It is not at all improbable that Hale 
harbored the feeling that his sist~r ought to have de-
vised the land to him absolutely, nor was it entirely 
unnatural that his personal friends should sympa-
thize in that feeling and be easily persuaded that to 
assist him in cutting out. the remaindermen and trans ... 
mitting his life estate into a fee in himself or in 
members of his immediate family would be a meri-
torius act. But this sympathy, however amiable and 
pardonable in itself, cannot be allowed to disguise 
the legal wrong involved in evading the effect of the 
testator's will and diverting the property from the 
purposes to which she had dedicated it." 
In none of the cases above cited do we have such clear 
and convincing evidence of a scheme to eliminate outstand-
ing prior interests in property by those having inferior in-
terests as that found in the present case. Here we have un-
equivocal acts, omissions and admissions that point with 
certainty to the collusive arrangement. In the cases cited, 
such collusive arrangement was found to exist notwith-
standing the absence of direct and positive proof. 
We respectfully submit that plaintiff acquired no title 
under the tax sale proceedings, but if it should be held other-
,eJ.W 
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wise the purchase of the plaintiff constituted in law merely 
a redemption. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. Q. VAN COTT, 
D. EUGENE LIVINGSTON, 
GRANT H. BAGLEY, 
E. LEROY SHIELDS., 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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